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Gay Marriage--A Modern Proposal:
Applying Baehr v. Lewin to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ANNE M. BURTON*
"[W]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness
of individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households....
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as
ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships
I. INTRODUCTION
Gay2 couples cannot legally marry anywhere in the United States. Of
course, many gay couples do "marry" in unofficial ceremonies3 or in
* A.B., Smith College, 1992; J.D. Candidate 1997, Indiana University. The author wishes to thank
her parents and family, and also Justine Desmarais for her assistance with the development of the paper
topic.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. To simplify discussion, I synonymously use the terms "gay' and "same-sex," even though, as the
Supreme Court of Hawaii aptly observed in Baehr v. Lewin, "Homosexual' and 'same-sex' marriages are
not synonymous .... Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or
heterosexuals." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n. 11 (Haw. 1993). Likewise, I use interchangeably the
phrases "heterosexual" and "opposite-sex." Further, I use the phrases "gay people" and "homosexual
people" throughout this note to include bisexual and transgender persons, gay men, and lesbians. The phrase
"sexual orientation" includes bisexual, heterosexual, and homosexual orientations.
3. Gay "marriages" have always occurred and will continue to occur, despite the fact that states do
not legally validate these unions. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,
79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993); JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994). In his
treatise on family law, Homer Clark discusses an interesting aspect of the history of marriage:
[U]ntil the middle of the eighteenth century . . . informal marriages were held valid by the
ecclesiastics whose jurisdiction it was to determine the validity of marriages.... Why the church
should sanction . . . wholly informal non-religious unions . . . can only be the subject of
speculation. It may have been done merely out of a recognition that it was better to regularize
than to condemn unions which would be formed regardless of what the law might say. If so, this
is another example of the law's willingness to conform once rigorous rules to the unruly
demands of human nature, a process many times repeated in the history of marriage and divorce.
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATnONS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2d ed. 1988)
(emphasis added). Perhaps state laws will similarly change to recognize gay unions which will be formed
regardless of what the law might say.
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contractual arrangements analogous to opposite-sex weddings. Still, states
refuse to legally legitimate these commitments.
In this Note, I assert that gay people have a fundamental human right to
marry and that the time has come in the United States for states to legally
recognize same-sex marriages. I define the term fundamental human right to
mean a universal individual right that precedes positive law. This Note
explores the law's denial of this very basic and human right and its impact on
gay Americans.
In this age of increasing globalization, gay rights advocates should look
to international human rights instruments to frame new legal arguments. In a
world where the GATT,' NAFTA,5 and other major international agreements
have become commonplace, international law provides an alternate and
increasingly powerful means of securing those basic human rights which
domestic laws ignore here at home. By urging individual states to comply
with the human rights commitments which the United States has entered into
on an international level, gay rights advocates may finally be able to change
an institution which has long resisted change.
The United States has signed many international treaties and agreements,
and one could apply the analysis in this paper to many of these instruments.
However, this Note looks to one document in particular, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6 Although the ICCPR does not
expressly protect gay marriage as a fundamental human right, or even gay
rights generally, the instrument does contain provisions on both the right to
marry and equal protection. As set forth below, these provisions can be
interpreted to support marriage rights for gay people.
Although the ICCPR does not specifically address gay rights, it is
nonetheless a useful analytical tool in this debate. The reasoning of the
landmark gay marriage decision from Hawaii, Baehr v. Lewin" illuminates its
usefulness. When applied to the relevant ICCPR provisions, the reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Baehr reveals a powerful
argument for the legalization of same sex marriage in the United States. In
4. General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.(5),(6), 55-61
U.N.T.S.
5. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOV'T OF THE U.S., THE GOV'T OF
CAN., AND THE GOV'T OF MEX. (Executive Office of the President, 1993).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States
Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
7. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
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fact, the reasoning embraced by the court in Baehr could unlock many gender-
based' protections for gay people, in both our domestic laws and in our
international commitments. For the purposes of this paper, however, I discuss
only the interplay between Baehr and the ICCPR.
Part II of this Note discusses the cultural significance of the institution of
marriage, arguing that, since marriage is both a treasure trove of social and
financial benefits and a court-endorsed fundamental right in our society, gay
people deserve access to this important institution. Part Ill posits that the lack
of legal protections for gay people in the United States, coupled with growing
anti-gay sentiment, necessitates looking to international human rights
instruments to secure basic rights for gay Americans. Part IV examines the
significance of the Supreme Court of Hawaii's gay marriage decision in Baehr
v. Lewin and the impact it could have on gay advocacy. Part V then applies
the Baehr reasoning to the ICCPR to suggest how gay rights advocates may
want to incorporate the Baehr Court's reasoning into future legal arguments.
This Note concludes that the United States must take a more active role in
protecting the human rights it promised to protect when it signed onto the
ICCPR, and that this arguably includes legalizing gay marriage.
II. MARRIAGE AS A CULTURALLY SIGNIFICANT INSTITUTION
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
Why is it so important that gay people have the right to marry? In fact, an
internal debate exists within the gay community over this issue. One critic of
the institution, while acknowledging that marriage "provides the ultimate form
of acceptance for personal intimate relationships in our society, and gives
those who marry an insider status of the most powerful kind," still maintains
that to legalize gay marriage would only work to assimilate the gay movement
into the mainstream, and thereby fail to address diverse family structures. On
the other hand, proponents of gay marriage, while acknowledging the much-
criticized patriarchal roots of the institution of marriage, argue that the
8. Throughout the paper, I use the term "gender" interchangeably with "sex" to highlight the
distinction between classifications based on sex and those based on sexual orientation. Normally, "sex"
refers to biological characteristics and "gender" refers to socially acquired characteristics.
9. Paula Etteibrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation? OuT/LooK, NAT'L LESBIAN &
GAY Q., Fall 1989, at 9, 9.
1995]
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legalization of gay marriage would ensure both state legitimation of their gay
relationships as well as the legal benefits which accompany marriage. As one
gay marriage proponent explains, "the issue is not the desirability of marriage,
but rather the desirability of the right to marry.""
Before exploring the interplay of the Hawaii case and the ICCPR, it is
important to consider the position of marriage as an institution in American
society. In so doing, one can better understand the urgency of gay people's
fight to have access to this basic human right.
One way to gauge a society's respect for an institution is to examine the
judicial opinions that discuss that institution. Often judicial opinions serve as
such indicators of the cultural significance of institutions. With respect to
marriage, U.S. courts-most notably the U.S. Supreme Court-have long held
that marriage is a fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Although states have the power to regulate marriage, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held on numerous occasions that the federal Constitution protects the right
to marry and that this right is fundamental.
In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Supreme Court stated that the liberty interest
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes the
right to marry. 3 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 the Supreme Court struck down a
state statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals, noting that
"[w]e are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."'"
In Loving v. Virginia,'6 the Supreme Court directly examined the right to
marry. In Loving, the Court struck down a Virginia statutory scheme which
prohibited interracial marriages. The Court held that Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statutes violated both the Equal Protection 7 and Due Process
Clauses'" of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this landmark decision, the Court
10. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LooK, Fall 1989,
at 9, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 398, 401 (William B. Rubenstein, ed., 1993).
11. 262 U.S. 390(1923).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
13. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
14. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
15. Id. at 541.
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Id.
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recognized the fundamental right of people to marry whom they choose. The
Court wrote:
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man".... To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to deprive all
the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State. 19
If the word "racial" above in Loving is replaced with "gender," and the words
"another race" are replaced with "the same sex," a strong argument emerges
for the legalization of same-sex marriage. The rationale that fueled anti-
miscegenation statutes-the "if-God-had-wanted" argument--resembles the
arguments used today to obstruct civil protections for gay men and women.
Although the facts of Loving involve racial classifications, Loving can be
read as standing for the general proposition that people may marry whom they
choose regardless of discriminatory laws banning certain types of marriage and
regardless of the non-traditional nature of those marriages."0 Indeed, Loving
supplies a useful framework to explore deep-rooted prejudices against gay
people and to sort out the issues surrounding the current debate over gay
marriage. In Loving, the Court upheld a different kind of marriage, one to
which few were accustomed in that era, and which many found frightening,
unnatural, and offensive. Certainly, many racists still consider interracial
marriages frightening, just as many people consider same-sex marriages
19. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
20. Some readers may protest that homosexual marriage deserves no more legal protection than do
incestuous unions, or marriages involving minors. Where one draws the line depends, of course, on one's
moral and political philosophy. The author sees a great difference between, on the one hand, two unrelated
consenting adults of the same sex wishing to marry, and, on the other, a father and daughter wishing to
marry. The debate then becomes a toss-up between how much, and whose, morality we wish to see reflected
in our laws, and how much individual choice we want the law to protect. Ironically, those who most favor
limiting government intrusion into our private lives may be the same people who most vigorously petition
states to prohibit same-sex marriages.
1995]
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frightening. In short, numerous aspects of Loving undeniably parallel the
modem prospect of legalized gay marriage.'
Some might insist that Loving applies only to racial classifications.
However, in Zablocki v. Redhail,' the Supreme Court underscored the
extensive scope of Loving: "Although Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals." In Zablocki,
the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which prohibited non-custodial
parents who owe child support from marrying without court approval. The
Court held that the statute impermissibly interfered with the fundamental right
of marriage.24
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution
protects marriage as a fundamental right, none of the above decisions directly
support the view that gay people have a fundamental right to marry their same-
sex partners. No United States court has ever held that marriage is a
fundamental right for gay people--not even the Supreme Court of Hawaii in
Baehr. This Note does not engage in a fundamental rights analysis of same-
sex marriage; Baehr promises that the legalization of gay marriage will occur,
if at all, under the auspices of equal protection, and not through a fundamental
rights framework. Still, to understand why gay Americans, like other
Americans, expect and deserve access to this constitutionally protected
fundamental right, one must appreciate the institution's status as a fundamental
right in this country.
A fundamental right is not an absolute right. 5 Yet, when courts declare
a right such as marriage to be fundamental, they should not uphold state
statutes limiting that right to heterosexual couples. To call a right
"fundamental," and then limit it to certain favored groups undermines the
weight of that designation. A state law that validates only heterosexual
21. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993).
22. 434 U.S. 374 (1977).
23. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 388.
25. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states may restrict a fundamental right so long as the
restriction does not place an undue burden on that right. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992). Nonetheless, when courts choose to deny a fundamental right to an entire group of people based
solely on the sameness of genders of the partners, courts both disable the individuals involved and vandalize
the right.
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BAEHR V. LEWIN AND THE ICCPR
marriages deserves no more judicial backing than a law prohibiting marriage
between interracial couples.
Consider the concept of marriage itself. There is no reason to interpret the
term marriage to mean only a heterosexual union. Before Loving, many
interpreted "marriage" to mean only same-race marriages and called upon
Judeo-Christian heritage to justify this ab initio definition. To limit the term
marriage to mean only opposite-sex unions makes equally little sense. After
all, few would disagree that the operative word in the phrase "heterosexual
union" is "union." Marriage is, above all, a union. For many Americans, such
a union does not require one man and one woman to constitute a commitment.
Despite the lack of judicial or legislative backing, many gay Americans
consider marriage a sacred institution. Unsurprisingly, many gay people wish
to formalize their commitments through marriage--just as state laws permit
heterosexual citizens to do.
One of the most common arguments against same-sex marriage is that
traditionally the essential purpose of marriage is to procreate. John Quinn, the
Archbishop of San Francisco has stated, "The permanent commitment of
husband and wife in marriage is intrinsically tied to the procreation and raising
of children."' The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently denied a
same-sex couple the right to marry stating:
Although we recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do have
children through adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination, and
that not all heterosexual married couples are able, or choose, to
procreate, we cannot overlook the fact that the Supreme Court has
only contemplated marriages between persons of opposite sexes--
persons who had the possibility of having children with each other. 7
Thus, the argument runs, since gay couples cannot reproduce, states should not
allow them to marry.
The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the link between procreation and
marriage. However, in important marriage decisions like Loving," the fact that
the two plaintiffs could procreate was not determinative. Rather, the central
issue in Loving was discrimination. Undoubtedly, many people marry solely
26. Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, available in LEXIS,
News Library, MAGS File.
27. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
28. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
1995]
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to procreate, but it does not follow that the ability or desire to procreate should
be a prerequisite to marriage. Imagine some of the ridiculous consequences
of such a threshold requirement. States would be required to prohibit all sterile
or impotent people from marrying. In contrast, the procreation prerequisite
would not bar fertile lesbians from marrying, since they can procreate by way
of artificial insemination. Likewise, gay men could satisfy the procreation
prerequisite simply by employing a surrogate. Or, were science to advance to
the point where doctors could incubate a fetus to term outside the womb, gay
men could procreate by securing a donated ovum.29
Procreation is only one of many reasons that people choose to marry.
Today, people marry for a variety of reasons including emotional
companionship and the security of a dual income. Homer Clark writes:
Recently, marriage has come to resume some of its importance as a
producing economic unit.., providing the benefits of two sources of
income for the maintenance of a single home. But the fact is that the
most significant function of marriage today seems to be that it
furnishes emotional satisfactions to be found in no other relationships.
For many people it is a refuge from the coldness and impersonality of
contemporary existence.30
Same-sex couples seek the emotional and financial security of marriage just
as opposite sex couples do. Aside from its lack of modern relevance,3 the
procreation argument ignores the legitimacy of many family relationships such
as adoptive families and couples who simply choose not to bear children-both
of which our culture accepts. In short, the procreation argument is specious.
29. For further information on emerging options for gay parenting, see Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay
Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 Am.
U. J. GENDER & L. 183 (1995).
30. CLARK, supra note 3.
31. The Supreme Court of Hawaii chastised the dissent for its claim that "the purpose of [HAw. REV.
STAT.] § 572-1 [the marriage statute] is to promote and protect propagation." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49 n. 1.
The Court cited the Hawaii legislature's 1984 removal from the marriage statute of the outdated requirement
that "[n]either of the parties is impotent or physically incapable of entering into the marriage state" as
support for the idea that the ability to procreate is not a prerequisite to marriage.
[Vol. 3:177
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B. The Social and Economic Benefits of Marriage
Anti-gay rights groups vehemently oppose laws that place gay people on
an equal legal footing with heterosexual people. Mike Gabbard, a Christian
fundamentalist activist in Hawaii who opposes gay marriage commented,
"They [homosexual people] want to be treated the same as us when they are
not." These critics feel that gay people asking for their basic human rights
is tantamount to a demand for special legal privileges.3 Such conservative
groups routinely employ this "special privileges" rhetoric against groups
seeking basic civil rights, such as women and racial minorities, as a way to
attack affirmative action programs." However, when applied to gay rights
efforts, such rhetoric falls flat. Gay rights advocates have never sought any
sort of affirmative action hiring or quota preference. As Evan Wolfson,
attorney and director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
Marriage Project, and an attorney for the plaintiffs in Baehr explains:
Like nongay people, gay people need and want the right to marry. We
don't need "gay marriage," or "same-sex marriage," or "just domestic
partnership"; we need marriage. The term gay marriage implies that
same-sex couples are asking for rights or privileges that married
32. Man to Man, Civil Rights, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 22.
33. For example, the leader of Coloradans For Family Values, Kevin Tebedo, stated, "The people in
the state do not want to give homosexuals protected class status. They [Coloradans] believe they
[homosexuals] already have equal rights, and they do . T. " he MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Dec. 31, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, MACLEH File. Coloradans For Family Values led the push to amend
Colorado's constitution ("Amendment 2") to prohibit cities from enacting gay rights ordinances.
Much to the dismay of gay rights advocates, who had launched a successful boycott of Colorado, the
amendment passed a state referendum on November 3, 1992 with 53.4% of Coloradans voting for the
amendment that would prohibit progressive gay rights legislation.
The constitutional amendment provided in part:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State
of Colorado . . . nor any of its agencies, [or] political subdivisions ... shall enact. . . or enforce
any statute, regulation [etc.] ... whereby homosexual [etc.] ... practices or relationships shall
constitute ... the basis ... of ... any person ... to have or claim any minority status quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination."
However, in Evans v. Romer, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a lower court's permanent
injunction barring enforcement of the amendment, stating that Amendment 2 unconstitutionally affected the
"fundamental right of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals to participate equally in the political process." Evans
v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Colo. 1993) (Evans I).
34. The 1992 official Republican party platform rejected "efforts by the Democratic Party to include
sexual preference as a protected minority receiving preferential status under civil rights statutes." William
Schneider, Anti-Gay Rhetoric: Handle with Care, 24 NAT'L J. 2098 (1992).
1995]
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couples do not have. What we are asking for is our equal right to
marry the one we love and care for, just as nongay Americans do. 5
Ironically, heterosexual Americans36 enjoy countless legal privileges through
marriage--marital privileges that stem solely from the fact that each spouse is
of a different gender.
These legal benefits are another indication of the cultural significance of
the institution of marriage. For example, one spouse may visit another in the
hospital, in jail, or in other "family only" restrictive areas. Since gay couples
are not related by blood and cannot become related by marriage such
establishments may lawfully deny gay people this important privilege."
Marriage also enables couples to file joint tax returns, claim money-saving
exemptions, and inherit from intestate spouses under forced-share statutes.3"
Foreign citizens gain the right to reside in the United States by marrying
Americans, thus avoiding deportation.39 Spousal benefits such as pensions, 40
worker's compensation,4 Social Security,4 health insurance from a spouse's
employer,43 and death benefits from insurance policies are all benefits of which
only heterosexual individuals may take advantage.
Gay people cannot enjoy marital life estate trusts, estate tax marital
deductions," family partnership tax income, damage recoveries from injury to
a spouse, bereavement leave, unemployment benefits for quitting a job to
35. Evan Wolfson, AltaredStates, 10 PERCENT, May-June 1995, at 28, 28.
36. This also includes homosexual people who happen to many persons of the opposite sex.
37. The right to enter restricted hospital areas takes on greater meaning when one considers the impact
of AIDS on the gay community.
38. E.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1(b) (1993).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) (1994) provides: "[Aln alien spouse... shall be considered, at the time
of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have obtained such status
on a conditional basis .... " Such conditions include the finding that the marriage is valid and that it was
not entered into solely to gain permanent resident status.
40. E.g., IND. CODE § 36-8-7-1 (cXl) (1993).
41. E.g., IND. CODE § 22-3-3-19(aXl)-(2) (1993).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988).
43. Having access to health care benefits for one's family is a sizable and valuable component of
many Americans' employment compensation packages. Single people voluntarily waive this component,
but gay people who wish to marry must involuntarily forfeit these valuable benefits. A handful of
municipalities (e.g., Berkeley, CA, Burlington, VT, and New York, NY) and corporations (e.g., Ben &
Jerry's Homemade, and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) have tried to extend such benefits to their gay
employees, but cannot convince their insurance carriers to cooperate. HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 1-9 to 1-10 (7th ed. 1993). The exorbitant cost of health care in the
United States makes this paucity of coverage all the more frustrating for gay people who wish to marry.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1988).
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move with a spouse, or access to neighborhoods and buildings zoned "family
only."' 5 "Because lesbians and gay men are almost always treated as legally
'single'--at best 'roommates'-for the purposes of taxes, immigration, tort law,
criminal law, government benefits, and housing restriction, gay couples are
denied access to the mechanisms by which society encourages and grants
benefits to heterosexual family relationships." '46 Thus, contrary to the popular
anti-gay rights rhetoric, heterosexuals, not homosexuals, enjoy many legal
privileges.
U.S. courts call marriage a fundamental right, and our society grants legal
spouses with many social and economic benefits. It is no wonder that gay
people have pushed to have their relationships legally recognized. Gay
couples in Denmark,47 Norway,48 and Sweden 9 already enjoy most marital
rights under the registered partnership laws of their respective countries."0 For
American gay couples, however, the struggle has yet to produce any solid
progress.
I1H. THE UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF GAY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
As stated above, American men and women may not lawfully marry
members of their own sex. Disgracefully, the prohibitions on gay life in the
United States neither begin nor end with marriage rights. The general ban on
gay marriage typifies a much larger problem--namely, the lack of basic civil
rights for gay Americans in almost every area of life the law touches.
This section discusses two important ideas. First, gay rights are human
rights issues, and the lack of human rights for gay individuals in the United
States merits international censure. Second, apart from state action denying
gay people their rights, there exists a strong anti-gay sentiment in the United
States that signals the need to look outside domestic laws for policies to protect
gay rights. Clearly, not all heterosexual Americans oppose gay rights.
45. CURRY, supra note 43, at XI.
46. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 377 (William B. Rubenstein, ed., 1993).
47. Denmark's partnership law was passed in 1989. Since Denmark legalized gay marriage, more
than 3,000 gay Danish couples have wed. See, e.g., First Gay Marriages in Sweden, Agence Fr. Presse, Jan.
2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WORLD File.
48. Norway's version passed the Odelsting chamber of the Norwegian Parliament on Mar. 29, 1993;
legalized Apr. 1, 1993; effective Aug. 1, 1993. See, e.g., id
49. Sweden's law became effective Jan. 1, 1995; parliament legalized gay marriage on June 7, 1994.
See, e.g., id
50. Registered partnership legislation is pending in many countries, including Finland, the
Netherlands, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Slovenia.
1995]
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However, because both the majority of voters and the countermajoritarian
courts refuse to recognize gay rights in this country, the universal rights
ratified by the United States in international instruments provide an alternative
to domestic law for gay rights advocates.
A. Gay Rights As Human Rights
Although it is not unlawful to be gay,5' or, for instance, for gay citizens to
vote, many statutes in the United States either directly discriminate against gay
people or indirectly license discrimination by failing to provide gay people
with rights equal to those enjoyed by heterosexuals. As second class citizens,
gay people do not have legal recourse for many wrongs committed against
them. Gay Americans risk losing their jobs,52 homes, health, and even custody
of their children, merely for being open about their sexuality.
51. Note, however, that the U.S. military may, and regularly does, discharge gay people from the
military merely for being homosexual, regardless of whether one engages in a homosexual act. 32 C.F.R.
pt. 41, App. A (1995) provides: "Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in
the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the
military mission." (emphasis added).
52. Although most employers hire employees on an at-will basis, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act limits this discretion by prohibiting discrimination by private and public employers on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1991). Notably missing from this
list of protected classes is sexual orientation. See generally Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title
VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991) (arguing that Title VII can be read, without a drastic rereading, as
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination); David E. Morrison, Note, You've Built the Bridge, Why Don't
You Cross It? A Call for State Labor Laws Prohibiting Private Employment Discrimination on the Basis
of Sexual Orientation, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 245 (1992); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 44-74
(Editors of the Harvard Law Review 1989) (discussing gender-based arguments advanced by gay rights
advocates).
On a brighter note, Senator Jeffords of Vermont recently introduced the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1995 (ENDA) in the Senate. The bill seeks to prohibit employment discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. Jeffords stated:
The time has come to extend this type of protection to the only group-millions of
Americans-still subjected to legal discrimination on the job....
When this issue has been raised in the states, the debate has often turned on the phrase
,special rights.' This bill does not create any 'special rights.' Rather, it simply protects a right
that should belong to every American, the right to be free from discrimination at work because
of personal characteristics unrelated to successful performance on the job.
141 Cong. Rec. S8501, 8501-02 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) [hereinafter ENDA
Bill]. A version of the bill was also introduced in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 1863, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Despite his supportive statements, President Clinton has wavered on gay issues,
most notably with regard to gay inclusion in the military. Moreover, the impending 1996 election may bring
a leader who is less supportive of gay rights.
BAEHR V. LEWIN AND THE ICCPR
As recently as 1990,"3 gay people could not enter the United States as
aliens' because the Immigration and Naturalization Act forbade entry of
persons afflicted with "sexual deviation"" and "[a]liens who have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.'" 6 Although gay foreigners
may now legally enter the country, people with AIDS still may not. 7
Moreover, gay foreigners generally cannot obtain extended political
asylum, even though they may suffer torture, harassment, and even execution
in their countries for being gay.58 For example, in Romania, gay people face
prison terms of one to five years for gay sexual activity. 9 Julie Dorf,
executive director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights
Commission (IGLHRC) in San Francisco, has addressed the lack of gay
rights around the world:
[N]o country is really good to us. Obviously, the places where we're
put to death are the worst. Iran is the most well-documented.... But
Saudi Arabia and some of the other Islamic countries have harsh laws
as well. Places where we're tortured, usually through psychiatric
treatment, include China, possibly Taiwan, the former U.S.S.R. [and]
Romania. And then there are places where the government is failing
to prosecute anti-gay death squads or random murderers; that is
primarily Brazil, Ecuador and Peru. Targeted murders of activists
53. See Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for Gay and
Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 439 (1994); Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public
Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 771 (1993).
54. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw, supra note 52, at 150-53.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(1982).
56. Id. at § 11 82(a)(9).
57. See generally, Tomas Fabregas AIDS Activist, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 23, 1994, at A21.
58. See In Re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558, at 16, 17, Immigration Ct., July 26, 1993, reprinted in
Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
625, 651 (1993). (U.S. immigration judge granted political asylum to a Brazilian homosexual man on the
ground that homosexuals are persecuted in Brazil). Id
59. Deborah Claymon, Gays in Romania Still Living in Fear, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File. International pressure from human rights groups and from the
Council of Europe has caused Romania's parliament to reconsider its anti-sodomy statute. Romania recently
signed onto the European Convention on Human Rights, but before the Council of Europe will accept
Romania into its organization, Romania must fulfill II conditions, including repeal of its anti-sodomy law.
Id
60. Dubbed by many as the new "gay Amnesty International."
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take place in Mexico, where over 12 have been killed in the past
year.6
Dorf founded the IGLHRC in 1991 in response to Amnesty International's
failure to document and address the international persecution of sexual
minorities. Since then, Amnesty has joined the fight against international
abuses of gay people's human rights. Amnesty International has even urged
the United Nations to incorporate express protection of gay people in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.62 So although human rights groups
recognize gay rights as human rights, the United States still has not. The
global consequences of the United States' failure to recognize homosexual
rights as human rights are profound and merit international censure. If the
United States is to be a world leader in human rights issues, it must first
address gay rights within its own borders.
B. Anti-gay Sentiment in the United States
Not only has the United States refused to recognize gay rights, there is
significant antagonistic sentiment toward gays in the United States. In a recent
poll, fifty-two percent of the respondents felt that homosexual relationships
were acceptable for others but not for themselves, only six percent felt that
such relationships were acceptable for both themselves and others, and thirty-
nine percent found them "not acceptable at all."63 Sixty-four percent of the
respondents did not "think that marriages between homosexual couples should
be recognized by the law." In a more recent poll, sixty-three percent of the
voters polled did not support legalizing same-sex marriage.' Across the
Atlantic, gay couples fair better in the polls. A recent Reuters survey reported
that nearly three-quarters (seventy-three percent) of the Dutch believe that
their government should allow gay people to marry."
61. See generally, Human Rights Group Documents Worldwide Oppression of Gays, SALT LAKE
TpiaB., Oct. 25, 1993, at A3.
62. Amnesty Focus on Gay Bias Hailed, CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, PAPERS File.
63. Statistics taken from a Time/CNN telephone survey of 800 American adults on June 15-16, 1994,
found in William A. Henry III, Pride and Prejudice, TIME, June 27, 1994, at 54, 57-58.
64. Statistics taken from a telephone survey of 1,000 voters on June 21-26, 1995 reported in Poll
Examines Voters' Stand on Legalizing Gay Marriage, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 6, 1995, at P6A; The
People Speak, PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 6, 1995, at A2.
65. Dutch Support Gay Weddings, Reuters, July 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES
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Addressing U.S. domestic human rights generally, Dr. Rick Halperin,
chairman of Amnesty International USA commented, "We want to make an
emphatic statement about the human rights situation here in the United States
... that this country is a major human rights violator."'  Indeed, a conspicuous
omission from the freedoms enjoyed in the United States is equal legal rights
for gays.
Clearly, gay people have some legal freedoms in this country, such as the
right to organize and conduct parades. This right flows from the equal
application of free speech67 rights to gay and straight people. Since courts and
legislatures continually block gays' access to other essential rights such as
marriage, and even sex, the United States' commitment to individual liberty
and equal justice under the law must be reexamined.
Twenty U.S. states still outlaw the private consensual expression of gay
sexuality.' Many states proscribe both homosexual and heterosexual
sodomy,69 but a handful of states--Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas--punish homosexual sodomy alone.7'
States that criminalize sodomy impose fines and/or sentences ranging from
$500 to life imprisonment. Idaho notoriously punishes both homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.7 Larry
Kramer, a gay writer and activist, expresses the frustration of many
homosexuals when he writes, "We are denied the right to love. Can you
imagine being denied the right to love?" It is worth noting that no state
prohibits only heterosexual sodomy. Indeed, homosexuals bear the brunt of
these archaic laws.
66. Nita Thurman, Amnesty International Conference Starts Today, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June
24, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. CURRY, supra note 43, at IX-X.
69. Although states differ in their definitions, sodomy is generally defined as oral or anal sex between
heterosexual or homosexuals.
70. It is ironic that so progressive a state as Nevada, which permits both gambling and prostitution,
would punish homosexual intercourse with a maximum sentence of 6 years in prison. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.354(l) (Michie 1993) states: "It is unlawful for any person to engage in prostitution or
solicitation therefor, except in a licensed house of prostitution." Contrast this with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.190 (Michie 1986), which provides: "[E]very person of full age who commits the infamous crime
against nature shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than I year nor more than
6 years."
71. CURRY, supra note 43, at IX-X.
72. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 46, at xvii. Certainly, states regulate only the
physical expression of love, not love itself.
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Many people argue that states need not repeal sodomy statutes since these
laws go unenforced, but one need not look any further than Bowers v.
Hardwick to see that states still enforce these statutes. Furthermore, the mere
existence of anti-sodomy laws constitutes an official expression of opprobrium
and creates an atmosphere that tacitly encourages gay bashing.
Groups hostile to civil rights for gays are advocating restriction of those
rights in various states. These groups have launched anti-gay rights initiatives
across the country in Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, Maine, and Florida. In Idaho
and Oregon, state constitutional amendments are fashioned after Colorado's
failed Amendment 2, which sought to block so called "protected-class" status
for gays. The Idaho Citizens Alliance, the conservative group which
spearheads the Idaho Proposition I campaign, seeks to limit access to
information about gays in schools and public libraries.74 Certainly, the
constitutionality of the goals of these campaigns is assailable. Still, these
widespread attempts to restrict gay rights create an atmosphere charged with
gay animus. The legal, social, and political climate for gay rights in the United
States is dismal considering our commitment to democracy and individual
rights. Julie Dorf writes:
If anything, the unprecedented right-wing opposition to [the gay
rights] movement . . . in this country underscores the need for
international support .... Americans... take for granted that the U.S.
is on the cutting edge of ... political progressiveness. In truth, gay
activists have much to gain by looking outside our borders,
particularly at a time when we are seeing the limitations ... such as
solely relying on the same handful of friendly congressional
representatives . . . . Meanwhile, sodomy laws are currently being
challenged in Nicaragua, Romania, India, Chile, and elsewhere-any
one of which is likely to see change before North Carolina."
73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Supreme Court upholding as constitutional Georgia's right to criminalize
and prosecute homosexual sodomy).
74. Michael Booth, Gay Rights Gain New Momentum, DENVER POST, Oct. 12, 1994, (discussing
Colorado Supreme Court's blocking of Amendment 2 measure), available in LEXIS, News Library,
MAJPAP File.
75. Julie Dorf, Think Globally, Act Globally, NEWSDAY, June 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAJPAP File.
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Thus, although the United States has historically played an active role in
promoting human rights, some countries in the world currently surpass the
protective measures afforded gays by the United States. The clearest example
is South Africa. Long ostracized for its disregard of human rights during the
apartheid era, South Africa recently became the first country in the history of
the world to incorporate protection of sexual minorities in its national
constitution.76
Despite the Baehr decision and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 1995," an anti-gay rights atmosphere pervades the United States. The new
conservative Congress makes domestic support for gay rights seem unlikely
in the near future. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, whose half-sister is
a lesbian, believes "[i]t is madness to pretend that families are anything other
than heterosexual couples.... Over time, we want to have an explicit bias in
favor of heterosexual marriage." '  The Rehnquist Court has also shown
hostility toward civil rights.79 Unless the United States elects a president who
is supportive of gay rights in 1996, the situation will deteriorate. As a
consequence of this strong anti-gay sentiment in the United States, gay rights
advocates need to look outside of the domestic arena in their fight for equality.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BAEHR V. LEWIN
Despite the dismal state of gay rights in the United States, one recent
judicial decision offers a glimmer of hope. Just as Brown v. Board of
Educations" marked a shift in the Supreme Court's treatment of racial
discrimination, Baehr v. Lewin may prove to be a similar watershed event for
gay rights analysis. This case marks a dramatic shift from the framing of gay
76. See generally Bob Drogin, New S. African Charter Endorses Rights for All, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
77. See ENDA Bill, supra note 52.
78. Joyce Price, Gingrich: Gays are Welcome; Urges Party to be Tolerant but Decries Same-Sex
Marriage, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
79. Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fitting
Celebration of the Bicentennial of the US. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L: REv. 203, 211 (1992). Strossen,
president of the American Civil Liberties Union, writes: "[T]he Supreme Court can no longer be relied on
to secure human rights .... Therefore, to secure domestic human rights, one must look to alternative sources
of protection .. .and to alternative forums other than federal courts." Id at 214. Strossen specifically
advocates looking to the ICCPR to secure human rights in the United States. Id at 221.
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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rights issues in terms of sexual orientation and privacy, to framing those issues
in terms of gender-based equal protection as applied to gay rights. 1
In Baehr, the plaintiffs--two female couples and one male couple--
challenged Hawaii's marriage statute," arguing that it violated their equal
protection and due process rights83 and their express right to privacy' under
the Hawaii constitution. In December 1990, Hawaii state officials in the
Department of Health cited Hawaii's marriage statute in refusing to issue
marriage licenses to the three same-sex couples. 5
In Baehr, the plaintiffs appealed a lower court's dismissal of their claim
that Hawaii's practice of refusing to give marriage licenses to same-sex
couples is an impermissible gender-based distinction that constitutes
discrimination against the applicants on the basis of gender. The Supreme
Court of Hawaii remanded the case86 stating that, "on its face and as applied,
[Hawaii's marriage statute] denies same-sex couples access to the marital
status and its concomitant rights and benefits, thus implicating the equal
protection clause of article I, section 5" of the Hawaii constitution. The
Court said that on remand the State of Hawaii must show that its prohibition
on same-sex marriages is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.88 Under this strict scrutiny standard, it will be very difficult for
Hawaii to justify the gender-discriminatory statute. If the state fails to meet
this standard, the Supreme Court of Hawaii will presume the Hawaii marriage
statute to violate the state's constitution.
81. For a detailed analysis of gender-based protections for gay men and women, see, e.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
197(1994).
82. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985). At the time of the challenge, Hawaii's marriage statute did not
expressly limit marriage to heterosexual couples. The Hawaii legislature has since amended Hawaii's
marriage statute to expressly permit only male-female marriages. Section 572-1 now provides: "In order
to make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a woman... [the parties must
meet various requirements]" (emphasis added).
83. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or
ancestry."
84. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6 provides: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
85. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
86. Remand to the Circuit Court was originally scheduled for 1994, but was delayed until September
25, 1995. Recently, the remand was rescheduled for 1996. Trial on Same-Sex Marriages Postponed,
PHOENIX GAzETTE, July 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
87. Baehr, 852 P. 2d at 67.
88. Id. at 68.
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The Hawaii legislature has characterized marriage as a policy issue and
declared its authority over policy matters.8 9 In the Baehr decision, the court
acknowledged that "[m]arriage is a state-conferred legal partnership, the
existence of which gives rise to a multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved
exclusively to that particular relation."9 However, the court also stated that
"[n]otwithstanding the state's acknowledged stewardship over the institution
of marriage, the extent of permissible state regulation of the right of access to
the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limits or constraints."'
Although the court clearly stated in Baehr that same-sex couples do not
have a fundamental right to marry under the Hawaii constitution, Baehr is a
pivotal case for gay rights. First, from a substantive point of view, the Hawaii
court has come closer to legalizing gay marriage than any other court in the
nation. If Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriages, the effects will be felt across
the country since other states must recognize gay marriages performed in
Hawaii under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.92 One
commentator writes, "The sparks that are flying in Hawaii would be [sic]
nothing compared with the firestorm that would be ignited in other states--
particularly those where the Christian right has become a potent force--if they
are required to recognize homosexual marriages performed in Hawaii.""
Second, and most importantly, Baehr marks the first time in the history of
the gay rights movement that a state supreme court has adopted the gender-
based rationale to protect gay rights. Gay rights advocates have tried
unsuccessfilly for years to use this rationale.
89. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, §§ 1, 6, 8.
90. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 47.
91. Id
92. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
However, whether states will recognize Hawaii-performed gay marriages depends on judges' interpretations
of their states' public policy schemes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2)(1969)
provides: "A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the
most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."
Several authors have provided a detailed analysis of the potential impact of Baehr in other states. See,
e.g., Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Lavs and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Havaii's
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REv. 450 (1994) (concluding that, absent an express
statement by a state legislature that same-sex marriages are void in that state, judges should not invalidate
gay marriages performed in Hawaii).
93. Gay Weddings: Gray Laws From the Economist, TULSA WORLD, July 7, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Library.
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To truly understand the impact of Baehr, it is crucial to keep the concepts
of sex and gender separate from sexual orientation. Sex and gender refer to
whether a person is male or female, while sexual orientation speaks to a
person's choice of sexual partners. Sex and sexual orientation are not
equivalent classifications, but all people have both attributes. For example, a
gay man is someone with a homosexual orientation and a male gender.
Although the distinction seems obvious, many people confuse, if not conflate,
the sex and sexual orientation classifications.
For years, gay rights advocates have pushed for the rights of homosexuals
using the gender-based rationale. Arguing for rights as gays and lesbians, gay
people have sought equal protection under the law as men and women. In
Baehr, the court based its holding on the simple, yet potentially revolutionary,
idea that if a man has the right to marry a woman, a woman also has the right
to marry a woman, and a man also has a right to marry a man.' Until Baehr,
courts had refused to accept this reasoning.95 The most inspiring aspect of the
Baehr decision is that the court employed the gender-based analysis to expand
such a tradition-laden substantive right as the right to marry. This high court's
initiative in applying gender-based reasoning to marriage rights could have
vast implications for gay people in terms of housing, employment, and other
rights.
Accordingly, Baehr signals a significant change in how gay rights
advocates should frame litigation in the future. Whether Hawaii legalizes
same-sex marriage remains to be seen, but the Baehr decision has already
made an important impact on the future framing of gay rights litigation.
Hopefully, the Hawaii Supreme Court will be the first of many courts to
recognize the legitimacy of the gender-based gay rights approach. However,
it is important to consider the relative merits and potential pitfalls of the
gender-based approach to expanding gay people's civil rights. On the positive
side, by framing the issue in terms of gender (i.e., male and female), gay rights
advocates may bypass some of the fear and misunderstanding usually
associated with homosexuals and allay the fear many people have of extending
rights to "yet another" group of people. Many Americans believe, if only very
generally, in equal rights for men and women. Although a claim of gender-
based discrimination is by no means a sure way to secure equal rights for gay
94. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
95. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
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people, many battles have already been fought and won to eradicate gender-
based discrimination.
On the negative side, gay rights advocates may risk censure for misusing
gender-based classifications. Opponents of gay rights might consider this
approach disingenuous since the ultimate goal is to secure gay rights, not
gender rights. Similarly, some gay people consider this approach self-
defeating.' Some believe that gay people should not ride the coattails of
gender-based victories, but should instead stake out their own sexual
orientation-based rights:
Nevertheless, gay people are men and women, and they need not deny
their genders. Indeed, gay people should demand the same gender-based rights
that heterosexual people have. A gay man is no less "male" than a
heterosexual man. The fact that a person is gay should not diminish that
person's rights as a man or woman. Thus, the gender-based approach to
expanding gay rights is simply a realistic refraining of the debate.
A final consideration is that this gender-based approach may run afoul of
legislative intent. In most cases, one can safely assume that drafters who
employ the word "sex" or "gender" in various statutory schemes do not
envision their words as being construed to provide protections for gay people.
Thus, the gay movement's use of gender classifications might jeopardize the
future enactment of gender-protective legislation if legislators fear their words
will be interpreted to secure protections for gay people. Although legislators
can avoid extending gender-based rights to gay people by expressly limiting
the scope of legislation, it will be difficult because gay men and women will
still be males and females, and thus will be entitled to gender-based
protections, despite the limiting language.
While the Baehr court's reasoning has its drawbacks as described above,
the decision itself has important implications for the gay movement. Viewed
as a precedent in judicial thinking, gays can begin to approach civil rights
litigation from a new angle regardless of the final outcome of the case.
96. See Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505 (1993) (arguing
that the Baehr court's focus on gender equity and removal of homosexuality from the discussion of same-sex
marriage signifies a step back for gay rights).
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V. APPLYING BAEHR TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
Today we reside in what many social theorists refer to as a global village.
Indeed, when one considers such links as the "Chunnel" connecting England
and France and the international information superhighway, it is apparent that
people of the world are coming together socially, if not culturally. Likewise,
we are coming together in political and legal alliances. In the past decade
alone, the world has witnessed the birth of the European Union,97 the
reunification of Germany, and the widespread growth of western-style
democracy in formerly communist countries. One of the most significant
globalizing events of this century was the formation of the United Nations.
The United Nations was founded in 1942 when twenty-six countries came
together to declare the common belief that "complete victory over their
enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious
freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well
as in other lands." This declaration marked the first use of the phrase "human
rights" in an international instrument and demonstrated a clear intention on the
part of member countries to scrutinize human rights conditions both outside
and within their borders. Today, over fifty international and regional
documents comprise the major human rights instruments of the world, some
of which the United Nations oversees." Many United Nations documents
address specific human rights, such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'" and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.' 1 Others,
97. Formerly organized and known as the "European Community," the European Union was created
on November 1, 1993 by 12 states in the Treaty of Maastricht.
98. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS at ix (Edward H. Lawson ed., 1991) (emphasis added).
99. E.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of June 26, 1981, ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS
AND INTRODUCTORY NOTES 274 (Felix Ermacora et al. eds., 1993); CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES T.S. l-D, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND INTRODUCTORY NOTES 284 (Felix Ermacora et al. eds., 1993); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (as amended by Protocol No. 3, entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, and
Protocol No. 5, entered into force Dec. 21, 1971).
100. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec.
21, 1965, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
101. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for
signature Mar. 1, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 96-2, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
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such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),' °
address more general human rights.
The ICCPR, together with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights"3 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,"° comprise the United Nations International Bill of Human Rights. As
of May 1, 1993, 114 countries including the United States had signed onto the
ICCPR.' °5 Among the rights the ICCPR protects are freedom of association,"°
freedom of thought and religion," 7 and freedom from slavery.'0°
A. Enforcement of the ICCPR
ICCPR Article 28 established the United Nations Human Rights
Committee to hear alleged violations of the covenant and to consider the
periodic status reports submitted by signatory countries."° The First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR allows individual citizens of a signatory country to take
complaints of alleged ICCPR violations directly to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee.
According to the United Nations, "Under the Optional Protocol,
individuals who claim that any of their rights set forth in the [ICCPR] have
been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may
submit written communications to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee."'' 0 Some countries that have signed the ICCPR have also signed
the First Optional Protocol."' However, although the United States is a
signatory country of the ICCPR, it has never signed the Optional Protocol.
102. ICCPR, supra note 6.
103. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
The United States has never ratified the ICESCR.
104. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1947).
105. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND INTRODUCTORY NOTES 24 (Felix Ernacora
et al. eds., 1993). Although the United Nations adopted the ICCPR in 1966, the United States did not ratify
it until 1992.




110. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: SELECTED
DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, 1990, at 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.I (1990).
111. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of Dec. 16,
1966, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND INTRODUCTORY NOTES 34 (Felix
Ernacora et al. eds., 1993).
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Therefore, individual Americans who claim that the United States has deprived
them of an ICCPR-protected human right may not file complaints directly to
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Additionally, the United States
is not completely self-policing with regard to the ICCPR.
The United States, like the other countries party to the ICCPR, must
submit periodic reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In
these reports, the United States accounts for the measures it has adopted that
give effect to the rights it has promised to protect by signing the ICCPR."
The Secretary-General then forwards each country's reports to the Human
Rights Committee for review.
The United States recently made its first report on its human rights record
under the ICCPR to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. In the 213
page report, the U.S. State Department admitted that "many challenges and
problems remain," especially in the areas of police brutality, the death penalty,
attacks on abortion clinics and activists, and sex discrimination, among
others."' In the report's preface, the head of the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, John H. F. Shattuck, writes, "It is of little use to
proclaim principles of human rights protection at the international level unless
they can be meaningfully realized and enforced domestically."
Although the United States monitors its own adherence to the ICCPR and
does not solicit input from individual citizens, the United States cannot control
outside criticism. Prior to the United States' submission of its report, the
World Council of Churches held hearings in the United States to provide a
sounding board for individuals who wished to have their stories heard by the
United Nations."4 The World Council is an independent international group
which serves as both a forum for individuals' complaints and as an alternative
voice to the United States' report to the Human Rights Committee.
In addition to the checks of independent monitors like the World Council
of Churches, parties to the ICCPR must contend with criticism from other
member states. Article 41 of the ICCPR provides that a signatory country may
assert that another signatory country has not fulfilled its obligations under the
112. ICCPR Article 40, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND
INTRODUCTORY NOTES 30 (Felix Ermacora et al. eds., 1993).
113. William Claiborne, Human Rights Report Includes Self-Criticism; State Department
Acknowledges U.S. Lapses, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at A9.
114. Kevin Fagan, Racism Hearing in Oakland; Witnesses Give Personal Accounts for U.N. Report,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1994, at A19. During the hearings, witnesses addressed the abuse of farm workers,
American Indians' demand for land, and police brutality.
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covenant. In other words, countries may monitor other signatory countries'
human rights records and file complaints with the United Nations Human
Rights Committee if a country violates an ICCPR-protected human right.
Nevertheless, by not signing the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the United
States significantly limits the ability of individual citizens to call on the United
States to comply with its human rights commitments under the ICCPR.
It is important not to overemphasize the power of international treaties and
covenants like the ICCPR. Countries that do not ratify or sign onto
international instruments have no obligation to comply with the established
rules. Even those countries which do ratify international instruments retain
their sovereign power and are the ultimate decisionmakers as to whether or not
to comply with the precatory standards laid out in a given document. One
observer of United States foreign policy, David Forsythe, writes, "The place
of human rights in U.S. foreign policy depends mainly on considerations of
power and policy and only tangentially on law. In the interplay of politics and
law, politics is the more determinative factor. Little is ever done merely
because a legal rule requires action . . . .""' However, in order to be an
effective critic of other nations' abuses, the United States must take care to
fulfill its own obligations under the human rights treaties it has signed. As
former President Jimmy Carter writes:
By ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the U.S. has taken one step forward, albeit at too slow a pace. It now
is incumbent upon future administrations to accelerate this progress
and take action to end our country's inconsistency and double
standards in dealing with human rights at home and abroad. We can
hardly clamor for justice in other parts of the world if we will not
pledge to provide justice for our own citizens."6
Thus, the United States must strengthen its leadership role in promoting and
encouraging human rights around the world by fully complying with its own
international commitments.
In addition to the inconsistencies between the rights protected by the
ICCPR and United States domestic law, the United States' commitment to the
115. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, at ix (1988).
116. Jimmy Carter, US. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRusTLAN Sci. MONITOR, June
29, 1992, at 19.
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document as a whole is in doubt. Many contend that the ICCPR has little
meaning in the United States because of the exceptions the United States took
to the ICCPR upon ratifying it in 1992.1" The United States made five
reservations, five understandings, and three declarations when it signed onto
the ICCPR. The most serious reservation was the statement that Articles I
through 27 of the ICCPR--most of the document-are not self-executing in the
United States. Thus, no action can be brought in the United States under the
ICCPR.
In a declaration by the United Nations at the Second World Conference on
Human Rights, members encouraged states to limit the number of reservations
they make when signing onto a treaty."8 Following the United States' recent
report on its compliance with the ICCPR, human rights experts from various
countries criticized the United States "for endorsing [the ICCPR] only half-
heartedly and keeping laws on its books that allow capital punishment for
teenagers."" 9
Despite the limited scope of U.S. enforcement of the ICCPR, the
instrument can be a valuable device for gay rights advocates around the world.
While the Human Rights Committee enforces the terms of the ICCPR, it is also
the main source of interpretation of the instrument. To understand the
potential scope of the ICCPR provisions, it is important to examine the Human
Rights Committees' interpretive decisions. For gay rights advocates, one
decision is particularly important.
In 1994, the Committee heard the Toonen case and determined that anti-
sodomy laws in Tasmania, one of the six Australian states, violated the terms
of the ICCPR' 2' The Committee found that the only effective remedy for the
plaintiff would be for the state to repeal its statutes. Most importantly, the
Committee made a clear statement which interpreted ICCPR Article 2 to
include sexual orientation in the list of explicitly protected classifications
covered by the ICCPR's provisions.
117. See Michael H. Posner and Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42
DEPAUL L. REv. 1209 (1993); Jordan J. Puast, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-
Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1257 (1993); Nadine
Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fitting Celebration of the
Bicentennial of the US. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 203 (1992).
118. Michael H. Posner, Reflections on the Vienna Conference, (AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW) NEWSL.,
Sept. 1993.
119. Julia Preston, US. Rebuts UN. Critics of Human Rights Record; Officials Make 1st Formal
Defense Under '92 Treaty, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at A19.
120. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
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B. The Toonen Case
The Toonen case involved an Australian citizen, Nick Toonen, a resident
of the Australian state of Tasmania. Australia is a signatory state of the
ICCPR, and has also signed the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR.
Therefore, individual Australian citizens may file complaints directly with the
U.N. Human Rights Committee.
Mr. Toonen filed a complaint alleging that Tasmania's anti-sodomy
statutes'2 ' violated his rights under Articles 2, 17, and 26 of the ICCPR.
Article 2 provides for the equal application of member states' laws; Article 17
provides for the right to be free from unlawful interferences with one's
privacy; and Article 26 is the equal protection provision of the ICCPR. The
Committee found that Tasmania had violated Articles 2 and 17 of the
Covenant, and therefore did not reach the question of whether it had also
violated Article 26. ICCPR Article 2 provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.'"
Mr. Toonen asked the Human Rights Committee to interpret the words "or
other status" in Articles 2 and 26 to include sexual orientation. The
Committee commented on the meaning of the phrase:
The State party [Australia, not Tasmania] after review of the travaux
preparatoires, the Committee's General Comment on articles 2 and 26
and its jurisprudence under these provisions, contends that there
'appears to be a strong argument that the words of the two articles ['or
other status'] should not be read restrictively.' While the travaux
121. Tas. Stat. R. §§ 122(a), (c) and 123.
122. ICCPR, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND IINTERNATIONALNOTES,
24 (Felix Ermacora et al. eds., 1993).
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preparatoires do not provide specific guidance on this question, they
also appear to support this interpretation. 2
However, the Committee did not use this clause to attack Tasmania's anti-
sodomy laws. Instead, it made a brief but powerful statement regarding gay
rights stating, "The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its
view the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as
including sexual orientation."'24
The Committee concluded that in order for Australia to fully comply with
the ICCPR, Tasmania would have to repeal its anti-sodomy statutes. Australia
vigorously urged Tasmania to repeal the offending statutes, but Tasmania
refused. An intense debate over the state's right to refuse to repeal its law
soon followed. Australia, considered a world leader in human rights
protections, gave Tasmania two months to repeal its ICCPR-violative
statutes.'
25
Australia, however, could argue under the Toonen decision, that twenty
U.S. states similarly violate the ICCPR. Notwithstanding this inconsistency
among signatory nations, Toonen is an important case for gay rights advocates
worldwide. The United Nations, through its Human Rights Committee, has
finally endorsed gay rights as worthy of protection by placing sexual
orientation within the scope of the ICCPR.
Thus, gay rights advocates should consider the broad application of the
ICCPR as one way to secure marriage rights for gays. Article 26 of the ICCPR
provides for equal protection on the basis of gender, regardless of sexual
orientation. As discussed below, the ICCPR protects marriage as a
fundamental right and thus seems to protect the right of gays to marry one
another. In light of the Toonen decision, there is great potential for the
ICCPR, together with other decisions such as Baehr, to protect many rights for
gays, including marriage.
123. ICCPR Article 17 provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence .... " Id at 27; The Human Rights Committee stated that the
concept of "privacy" includes adult consensual sexual activity in private. Further, the Committee decided
that Tasmania's anti-sodomy laws interfered with Mr. Toonen's privacy, even if the statutes remain
unenforced, and that this interference was arbitrary. See U.N. Doec., supra note 122.
124. Unfortunately, although the Human Rights Committee incorporated sexual orientation as a
protected class under the ICCPR, to do so, the Committee blended the idea of "gender" with "sexual
orientation."
125. United Nations Panel Attacks Tasmania Law Against Homosexuality, May 13, 1994, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., at A-32, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWS File.
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C. The ICCPR Through the Lens of Baehr
The gender-based reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in
Baehr should have an impact on the way gay rights advocates frame human
rights arguments under U.S. laws and international treaties. Baehr gives
important new meaning to all laws and instruments such as the ICCPR which
incorporate gender based protections.
Although the ICCPR does not contain provisions that specifically protect
homosexuals, it does contain provisions which protect gender based rights.
Article 26, the equal protection section of the ICCPR, provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.126
This section implicitly 2' prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has not formally ruled
whether the inclusion of the phrase "or other status" in Article 26 affords
protection based upon sexual orientation.'28 Nonetheless, Article 26 arguably
protects the right of gay people to marry.
The ICCPR also contains a provision which protects the right to marry.
Article 23 provides: "[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to
marry and to found a family shall be recognized."' 29 Article 23 does not
expressly protect the right of of same-sex partners to marry. However, it
seems clear that it protects marriage as a fundamental human right. A
concurrent reading of Article 23 and Article 26 supports the concept of gay
marriage as a fundamental human right. Such a reading is not unprecedented.
In Baehr, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that the equal protection clause
of the Hawaii constitution prohibits gender-based discrimination. Recall that
126. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added).
127. Unfortunately, Article 26 does not expressly protect against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
128. See generally, U.N. Doc., supra note 120.
129. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Article 26 explicitly provides for equal protection on the basis of gender,
regardless of sexual orientation.
The Baehr court held that if a man can marry a woman the state cannot
prohibit a woman from exercising the same right. Thus, under the equal
protection clause of the Hawaiian constitution, a woman may marry a woman;
a man may marry a man. Because of the similarities between Hawaii's
constitution and Articles 23 and 26 of the ICCPR, Baehr's reasoning could
successfully be applied to the ICCPR resulting in the same conclusion that the
Baehr court reached.
Thus, there are several ways to make use of the ICCPR in the struggle for
gay rights. First, as previously discussed, the logical interpretation of the
ICCPR itself arguably stands for the right of homosexuals to marry one
another. For gay rights advocates in the United States, this is a very important
step because the United States has ratified the agreement. Second, the Toonen
decision is a great triumph for the gay rights movement, Finally, the Baehr
decision is the pinnacle of the analysis. Using the Baehr court's reasoning,
gay rights advocates have a new and very strong argument that the United
States must recognize gay marriage and other gay rights as fundamental human
rights that can no longer be denied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Baehr signals a fundamental change in one court's framing of
gay rights issues, gay couples in the United States continue to wait for the right
to marry--the same right their heterosexual friends have exercised for
centuries. Setting aside for now the attempt to shelter sexual orientation
protection under due process claims of privacy, gay rights advocates may be
able to unlock the door to many rights which gay people have been denied by
pushing for gay rights under the auspices of gender-based equal protection.
Whether or not Hawaii legalizes gay marriage, Baehr gives new legitimacy to
gender-based arguments. Now it is time to truly test these arguments. Gay
rights advocates should apply the reasoning in Baehr wherever gender-based
protections exist. American gay rights advocates must demand that the United
States fulfill within its own borders the human rights promises it has made
internationally.
In the United States, where we prize individual liberty, human rights, and
the separation of church and state, states should permit consenting adults to
marry one another, regardless of their sex or sexual orientation. Because this
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right does not currently exist in any state or federal law in the United States,
and given the slim prospects for progressive change, gay rights advocates
should press for this basic right through the use of international human rights
agreements.
The United States has the unique opportunity to lead the world in the
protection of gay people's human rights. As one of the founding members of
the United Nations and one of the world's political and economic superpowers,
the United States needs to reassess and reconfirm its role in promoting human
rights in a changing world. As one author points out, "[t]he United States will
not be a player in the development of international human rights law unless
and until domestic legislation explicitly implements the pertinent international
provisions.' '30 To satisfy our commitments under the ICCPR, and to maintain
our position as a world leader in human rights, the United States must take
steps to legalize gay marriage.
130. James F. Smith, NAFTA and Hwnan Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 793,
808 (1994).
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